

Guerrilla Work In Its Current Dilemma

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Since its inception, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has been subjected to a hostile media attack that would require many pages to explain and elaborate its causes. However, the extent of this adverse attack since the founding of the Front has been limited by the merger of three groups (Youth of Revenge [the Palestinian branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement], the Heroes of Return, and the Popular Liberation Front [PFLP-GC]) in October 1967, and until January 1969, when the split of the group that later called itself the Democratic Front was almost completely consolidated. The size of the counterattack on the Popular Front between those two dates was much less than the attack that doubled in its wake, and it is still continuing, in one form or another, until now.

Since the formation of the Popular Front, it has been clear that this vanguard group in the armed resistance movement is “a plowing ground,” susceptible and sensitive to many rapid developments that immediately led to political, organizational, and military repercussions within the Front, and perhaps this in particular is what led to three basic outcomes:

First: The various parties feel the potential danger posed by the rapid development within the Popular Front, and thus attempt to work to besiege it.

Second: The two splits that occurred within the Front. The first was the [PFLP-GC] “Popular Liberation Front,” which was inclined towards a militant approach and which found that it was better for its orientations to depart from the organizational relationship it had with the “Youth of Revenge” and the “Heroes of Return” [groups] in October 1967, in face of the rapid growth of the process and its [declining] commitment to Marxism-Leninism. The second split was the departure of [DFLP] a group that considered its leftist loyalties to be too large to fit within the organizational framework of the Popular Front. As for the Heroes of Return group, it took a decision to completely integrate organizationally into the Front last December.

Third: The tremendous acceleration in ideological commitment to Marxism-Leninism and the reflection of this commitment on the issues of political relations, education, organization and military activity within the Popular Front, which was represented by the issuance of the “Political and

Organizational Strategy for the Popular Front” in wake of the February 1969 conference, which is the report that defines the clear commitments of the Popular Front, as well as in conducting revolutionary developments in organizational relations and in political and military activity, and in starting work in the Cadets School, which follows a military training and political educational program that is of the highest levels and the first of its kind, worthy of graduating ranks of political fighters at the level of revolutionary work tasks.

However, all of this remained unknown to the majority of those following the events, in the face of an unparalleled adverse media attack on the Popular Front. The Arab regimes - their right and left - and the organizations of the resistance movement - their right, center and left - participated in this attack, and the international party institutions - their liberals, Marxists and Trotskyists!

In the midst of all this, an amazing encirclement and siege operation took place, to the point where it is sufficient to point out that Al-Ahram [newspaper], for example, when hijacking the American plane, attributed that operation to the PLO! The Popular Front was not in a position to respond to this counterattack:

Firstly, because its missions as a revolutionary organization were so enormous, organizationally, politically, and militarily, that it made any attention other than the duty of fulfilling those missions a mere waste that benefited no one.

Secondly, because it was, and still is, considering the establishment of a Palestinian national front an urgent task on which the fate of the revolution depends to a large extent, while the quarrels, exchange of accusations, and tense atmosphere could only hinder such an approach.

One look at the nature of the adverse media attack that was directed against the Popular Front, and is still being directed, is enough to show that it is rare to find an accusation that has not been brought against it. *It is right-wing, it is fascist, and it is subversive. It is “the thief” of the revolutionaries’ efforts and is far-left. It is regional, it is Arab, it is imposing Marxism, and it is nationalist chauvinistic. It is reactionary and atheist.* These accusations have been repeated in countries extending from Rabat to Kuwait: The Front newspaper is banned from entering Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, and sometimes it is banned in Jordan. As for its activities, with the exception of

Aden, Amman, and Baghdad, it is besieged, prohibited, or monitored. Its men have tasted, and still are, the taste of prisons in all Arab capitals without exception, yet it alone leads the most prominent glories of the resistance ([in] Gaza). It has more than five hundred fighters in the enemy's prisons, it has lost the largest number of military officials, and it is the Palestinian organization most capable of striking at home. Above all that, it is the only Palestinian organization that has a clearly declared strategy and is completely committed to this strategy in practice.

Because of all this, the right, both Arab and Palestinian, reject the Popular Front and work to besiege and isolate it. The infantile left also gives almost all its time to work to distort it and blow up rumors and accusations against it. In the midst of all this, the Popular Front is making its way, and it is becoming increasingly aware, not only of the size of the forces facing it, but also of the impasse of Palestinian and Arab national action. It is for that reason in particular that every molecule of its behavior is volunteered for the first and foremost urgent task. It is working to get out of this impasse to confront the enormous forces mobilized against the Palestinian resistance movement. It is convinced that such a confrontation - at the level of responsibility - can only be carried out through a Palestinian national front that is a link in an Arab national front, and therefore drowning in polemics is a distortion of the revolutionary trend that demands, more than ever, continuous work to achieve the minimum tasks of the battle.

This quick introduction was necessary to enter into the topic we are dealing with, because without it, this research cannot serve its fundamental purpose.

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It is usual for any critical research of the resistance movement in its current stage to fall into a field of traps. We are not talking here about the traps created by the emotional or sectarian outlook, or the outlook that overrides the requirements of the media need, over the critical approach, or that limits itself - voluntarily or under compulsion - to tactical details. Actually we are talking

about more dangerous traps related to the critical approach followed in measuring the resistance movement.

This approach usually falls into “selectivity,” but it also falls into rigid sectarianism, and most important of all is that it absolves itself of commitment to the scientific and objective basis of the critical process, which is an integral part of the entire revolutionary work, if the revolution - as it actually is - is definitely and necessarily obligated to explaining the world and changing it at the same time.

The reality of resistance, like any other reality, is in fact the movement of many particles, linked together by a continuous dialectical bond. There is no doubt that the fatal critical sin is committed when a state of rest is imposed upon one part of this reality, and then one repeats a series of errors: arbitrarily separating this part from an unlimited number of other parts, then forcibly resting it, then studying, criticizing, or measuring it in isolation from this dialectical relationship between work and knowledge.

From here we see how several critical articles have appeared over the past period measuring the Palestinian resistance using the framework of armed action alone, while other articles have appeared measuring the resistance in a purely sectarian way, turning the issue into a pile of theories and literary works. There are diagonal measurements that isolate the Palestinian resistance just as a chemical laboratory isolates a living cell.

Any critical view of the resistance, in its current stage, presupposes an awareness of the sum of the parties of this dynamic relationship of the whole issue, and assumes looking at the reality of this resistance from the angle of its mutual relationships, movement, change and growth. The dialectical method is itself, in its essence, critical and revolutionary - as Marx says - and it is undoubtedly continuous, and hence the critical process can only be part of the sum of the details whose mutual, tense, or contradictory relationships constitute the continuous movement of history.

The fundamental error begins when separating theory and practice and creating barriers between them. This leads to sectarian stagnation on the one

hand, and to a mechanical understanding of history and empiricism in practicing attempts to change it on the other hand.

This brief introduction was necessary to define a critical method: There is no doubt that the critical method should be rejected as it does not lead to making practice capable of correcting theory, and thus enriching it, so that it can come back and influence reality. Therefore, we must from the beginning identify the basic parties to the issue, these parties that their relations with each other constitute the underlying foundation and true essence of the current revolutionary process, the artificial separation of which only leads to chaos.

There is, firstly, the issue of political thought in the Palestinian resistance, and secondly, there is the issue of practices, among which combat practice stands out in the first place, but thirdly, there is what gives these two issues their depth and effectiveness, and it is concentrated in the organizational issue.

Mao Zedong summarizes this triangular issue by saying: “Our mission is like crossing a river, but we cannot cross it without a bridge or a boat, and if we do not solve the problem of the bridge and the boat, then all talk about accomplishing missions without solving the problem of work methods is just gossip.”¹

We are faced with a triple dilemma: theory, practice, and method, which is essentially an organizational issue. This means that any critical study of the resistance movement cannot consider one of these three parties, dwell on it, and make it the sole standard for evaluating what is happening. If it did that, it would immediately fall into fatal mistakes.

It is no longer acceptable, nor is it feasible, for revolutionary work to be merely experimental practices unarmed with political thought. Likewise, political thought or theory, without actual practice, usually leads to chatter within a vicious circle. However, the distance existing between theory and practice cannot be covered mechanically. The relationship between political thought and its practice, between theory and practice, raises a third issue of parallel importance, which is the organizational issue.

¹ Mao Zedong - Selected Works (Beijing) Vol. 1 - p. 220

If “organization is the form of mediation between theory and practice,”² then the political issues emanating from the theoretical vision and practices cannot be separated mechanically - as Lenin says - from organizational issues. There is no doubt that the opposite is also true, because the organizational issue is not a technical issue, but rather a party in the growing dialectical relationship between theory and practice: when organization is not the product of a revolutionary theory, it ends up in a conspiratorial theory, and when the organization is not the means of executing that theory into practice, it ends up in an isolated sectarian group.

Political ideology determines the form and tasks of the organization, (the relationships of its members to each other and their relationships to the masses, the relationships between the leadership and the base, the bodies emanating from the organization, their relationships, tasks, etc.) It is the organization that can carry out the tasks of correcting and enriching the revolutionary process through its continuous ability to measure practices over theory. From this perspective, it constitutes the most effective guarantee to prevent the spread of plagues that became known when faced with revolutionary experiences throughout history: (the cult of personality, adventurism, militarism, left infantilism, opportunism, individualism, bureaucracy, etc.)

Theory becomes aimless if it is not linked to revolutionary praxis, and likewise praxis will become directionless praxis, if its path is not illuminated by revolutionary theory.³ This is the theory with which Stalin apparently interpreted Lenin’s famous sentence: “Without revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement.” But all of this is not magic formulas, because “Marxism emphasizes the importance of theory precisely and only because it can guide action.”⁴ The main factor in this equation is organization.

The emphasis on the fundamental value of the organizational issue is due here, in fact, to much of the neglect that this issue received in Arab political developments during the past half century and the costly consequences that resulted from that neglect. Hence, any evaluation process aims to look at

² György Lukács (translated by [George] Tarabishi - On Revolutionary Organization)

³ Stalin: Foundations of Leninism.

⁴ Mao Zedong: Selected Works (Vol. 1 - p. 445).

Palestinian resistance activity. During its past experience, it must arm itself with a method, otherwise it will end up being merely subjective sensations and sentiments, subject to one degree or another to emotion and particulars, and lost in the overall complexities that surround the current experience: there are those who see guerrilla action now as mere military practices and criticize them, or applaud them, on this basis, and there are those who see this stage as merely an occasion to compete in building theoretical positions or immerse themselves in the process of political theorizing and nothing else. There is no doubt that there are those who take both matters, practice and theory, as the basic background for their evaluations. However, all of this remains incomplete, and there is no doubt that it leads to a violation of the correct balance of the necessary and indispensable critical process, which, no matter how bold it is, can lead to opposite results when its vision is directed at one part of the picture, and it overpowers the rest of its interconnected parts. A responsible critical view, with regard to this particular stage that the Palestinian resistance movement is going through, must confront a number of fundamental issues through its dialectical character, and there is no doubt that a process of “silencing” part of it will lead the assessment to draw wrong dimensions of the nature of the things that are happening: Measuring the Palestinian resistance by mere military rhetoric, or measuring it merely by a theoretical political position, or measuring it by a mere organizational form, will inevitably lead to deception of the masses, if we do not say self-deception, and these three issues must, through awareness of their dialectical relationship, be tested together.

It is necessary to acknowledge the difficulty of such work, which is primarily due to the organic, objective interrelation between these three topics: theory, practice, and organization.

However, what is obvious is that the purpose of looking at each of them separately should be the result of a scholarly need only, provided that the inevitable overlap between these topics is allowed to reach its extent.

1 - Political Thought In The Resistance Movement

Lenin's statement that "there is no revolution without a revolutionary theory" is no longer a matter of debate and discourse. But this issue does not stop here, and this slogan does not constitute a magic formula. Rather, it may be the beginning of a more complex issue. The Communist Party of China itself declares that "Marxism-Leninism is not a belief, but rather a guide for action. It requires that we start from reality, that we apply its principles flexibly and in a creative spirit to solve problems that arise in the course of the struggle, and that its theories be allowed to continue to develop."⁵ Mao Zedong himself, as we mentioned, decided that Marxism's emphasis on the necessity and importance of theory is due precisely, and only, to the fact that it can guide action. [Mao Zedong himself also described attempts to literally transfer Soviet applications to the Chinese revolution as being like someone cutting his feet to fit a shoe.⁶] This undoubtedly indicates that the issue of loyalty to a revolutionary theory is a matter of creativity or a matter of dealing with objective reality through that dialectical process in which application and theory exchange the richness of their commonality. Perhaps it was Lenin who stressed this issue the most.

In the Palestinian arena, there has been a double opposition from two different sides to this issue: on the one hand, one party stresses the lack of necessity and importance of revolutionary theory in the revolution, and on the other hand, another party insists on twisting its head to fit the ready-made Marxist hat. It is useful to note the results of these two contradictory behaviors: the first party that dismisses the importance of revolutionary theory in the revolution is moving more and more towards showing its weight on the level of practice, in an attempt to give it the first and perhaps the only importance, so its presence has taken on a primarily military character, while the other party has moved towards immersing itself in theorizing - in the name of the left - at the expense of true revolutionary practice, and sometimes in contradiction to it, making the

⁵ Deng Xiaoping's report to the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China 9/15/1956.

⁶ Selected Works - (Volume 1) page 266.

basic value of its existence dependent on theories, terminology and positions transcribed in copies from literary works of the Marxist-Leninist left. Why, then, is emphasis repeated by professors of revolutionary strategy on the necessity of revolutionary theory and its necessity in particular as a guide to action? The revolution, even in its daily details, cannot advance if it is not equipped with a strategic horizon, and the basic value of tactical moves - political and military - is that they ultimately serve the interest of that strategic horizon.

It is known that - even militarily - tactical issues seem far from the ultimate political goals. But it seems difficult, if not impossible, to separate political goals from the strategic vision. If we are convinced that the tactic is one party in a dialectical process that is always progressing, then it is impossible for that tactic not to have a broad strategic framework. "An understanding of the whole facilitates the handling of the part, and because the part is subordinate to the whole. The view that strategic victory is determined by tactical successes alone is wrong because it overlooks the fact that victory or defeat in a war is first and foremost a question of whether the situation as a whole and its various stages are properly taken into account."⁷

This makes it clear that war (which is usually defined as politics in its violent degree) is primarily a strategic vision, and such a vision can only be available through the evidence of the work of any revolutionary theory. The various stages of the revolution, from the smallest to the last, are subject by nature to everything that the things of our world are subject to: the continuous dialectical movement. Therefore, it is governed primarily by the decisions of man, who is responsible for his own destiny. In our time, such decisions are no longer subject to empiricism or dogmatism. The Palestinian resistance in its current stage is still lacking - with this organization or that, and to one degree or another - its strategic horizon with regard to two very important dimensions: the national dimension, and the class dimension.

Emphasizing the importance of these two dimensions together, and at the same level, does not seem to be any contradiction, as might be imagined by poor craftsmen. Talking about the national-patriot dimension is not talking about

⁷ Previous source, p. 270.

chauvinism, or the bourgeoisie's search for a framework that justifies its presence in power and at the top of production relations. Rather, it is talking about the common historical characteristics and the common destiny of the Arab working classes, who have the primary interest in the battle of liberation and in defeating their triangular enemy: Israel, imperialism, and reactionism. Talking about their one battle, not only as an objective fact imposed by the fact that they belong to one nation, but also as a fact imposed by the battle itself.

These two dimensions of the revolution: its national dimension and its class dimension, together constitute an essential depth in the future of the Palestinian struggle. However, they remain cloudy, despite the progress the Palestinian armed struggle has come so far. The issue, at the national level, results, in large part, from the loss of class horizons in analyzing and seeing objective conditions. This inability led to some factions falling into the diagonal trap. It is possible to look briefly at this issue in the following way: The objective facts and their developments led to a leap achieved by the Palestinian national movement. Overall, it is more advanced than what the Arab national forces were qualified for. However, if the Arab national movement personally bears part of this responsibility, then placing all the responsibility on it, to the point of estrangement, is a failure to understand the nature of reality and its developments: the petty-bourgeois Arab regimes were unable to create the conditions sufficient for the growth of these Arab national movements, or to create an atmosphere practically suitable for the growth of other powers, because most of these regimes were not only petty-bourgeois, but they added to this characteristic - by the nature of their deployment and practice - the military and police character. Thus, it was exhausted by its limited conception of partisanship, organizational work, (even that organizational work that it tried to build to serve its own purposes) the Arab national parties, and its legacy to the battle when it reached a more advanced stage, formations that were exhausted, shaken, and tired to the utmost extent, both intellectually and organizationally.

There is no doubt that the petty-bourgeois regimes were surprised by the defeat before they had completed their role, and this defeat overthrew, if not completely exposed, their impotent and incomplete program. However, the

presence of Arab bourgeois regimes that are more reactionary and more deeply rooted in tribal, feudal, or monopolistic control than the petty-bourgeois regimes has made the fall of the latter, along with its previous and subsequent programmes, an issue that did not happen as quickly as the scale of its defeat and the speed of its occurrence. Rather, it is - on a popular level - still occurring. Or at least some of them still attract popular loyalties, and compete with the resistance movement over those loyalties.

This distorted picture of the reality created by the defeat not only allowed these petty-bourgeois regimes to continue to exhaust the local national movement, destroy it, and block it with various pretexts. Rather, it also led to obscuring the strategic horizon of the revolution among some Palestinian resistance factions, which - at times - took the “Arabs” (thus, without specificity) basis on the failure to liberate Palestine, and at other times a contradictory approach that dealt with these “Arabs” but this time specifically: the regimes) without seeing this as dealing with those who failed to liberate, and who are still practicing the cruelest means of suppression, against creating any climate conducive to the growth and production of a popular revolutionary force that is the only natural ally of the resistance movement.

Realistically, there are two fundamental and interrelated questions in this context: Can the people of Palestine alone (or are they alone required to) liberate Palestine? If the answer is no, then who should the Palestinian revolution fight and against whom? These two questions raise a strategic issue instantly, in which the militant line appears to be completely intertwined with the political line, such that the importance and necessity of revolutionary theory cannot be underestimated, because such questions do not necessarily push towards defining the national horizon only, but also require resolving a series of important issues, the foremost of which may be the issue of identifying the enemy and identifying the ally - the issue of determining the longest-lasting tool of the revolution, the issue of defining the method of liberation, the issue of defining the vanguard organization, its tasks and relationships, etc. These issues cannot be resolved without a theoretical guide that interacts with continuous revolutionary practices and leads to the exploration of the class horizon of the battle. It is a grave mistake to place these two issues, in the political thought

and practices of the resistance, according to a mechanical arrangement. Rather, their dialectical overlap must be realized to the greatest extent, and in light of the objective conditions surrounding the Palestinian cause from a historical perspective, from a realistic perspective, and from a perspective of the future, the national horizon seems inevitably fundamental. If this truth is called upon to take its toll on the intellectual, organizational and combat stance of the Palestinian resistance, then the national horizon of the battle is the other side of this truth, and all of that makes any strategic concession to the class struggle “capable of immediately reflecting itself in the form of a strategic concession to the national struggle.” “The tendency of class acquisition was formed, in fact, during the National Revolutionary War, the reserve forces for the tendency of national appropriation.”

Thus, in order for “the struggle against the tendency of national capitulationism to become a decisive and strong struggle, the trend towards class capitulationism must be opposed.”⁸

If this statement was true for China during the war against Japan, it is even more true in comparison to the current Arab reality, where imperialism, through puppet regimes, preys on the masses’ tendencies towards national liberation and class liberation in a progressive manner. If Mao’s thesis in China was that class capitulationism was a reserve force for the tendency of national capitulationism, then national capitulationism in the Arab World, meaning the consolidation of the control of the feudal and bourgeoisie puppet classes linked to colonial or imperial colonialism, who benefited from fragmentation and nationalization and the splitting of the struggle unity of the Arab working classes in their various arenas, in turn, is a reserve that works to console the tendency of class capitulationism.

All of this raises a question that the Palestinian resistance movement has not yet resolved: whether the Palestinian revolutionary uprising is the gateway to the Arab Revolution, or whether it is required for the Palestinian liberation cause to have an Arab revolutionary gateway. In fact, the answer to this question will be imposed by practice, but such an imposition cannot occur arbitrarily or by

⁸ Mao Zedong - Selected Works (Beijing), Vol. 2, p. 93.

chance, and there must be continuous critical review processes to find the most effective theory. It is true that the Palestinian armed resistance provides a daily example to the Arab masses, and in this area it sometimes carries out direct incitement, but it is wrong to think that this type of daily example constitutes a complete goal in itself, as there is no decision that the experience itself reaches a point where the demand for resolution is more urgent, and perhaps the ability to get out or not to get out from the impasse depends on that resolution.

What is the dilemma?

It is non-revolutionary to fail to see the dilemma of the resistance at this stage, and to continue to ignore this dilemma, whether through stubbornness, or by relying on media solutions. We believe that this impasse now constitutes, and will increasingly constitute, the historical point at which the revolution must resolve the issue with a scientific answer and real revolutionary solutions. The armed resistance movement, in its most crystallized form, began in the wake of the June War. There is no doubt that the occupation and the shock caused by the rapid defeat created in the armed Palestinian resistance a kind of healthy lung in the atmosphere of suffocation that prevailed in the wake of the defeat. However, while in addition to the reality of the occupation, the objective conditions of the revolution were still not at a mature stage, and the revolutionary tool that rushed to perform the tasks of the revolution - quantitatively and qualitatively - was below the ability to perform these tasks. There is no doubt that many factors led to that reality, and if it is unfair to blame the Arab and Palestinian national movement, its goal, and its experience of failure and impotence. It is also unfair to blame this reality on the Arab petty-bourgeois regimes alone, as responsibility in this area is mutual, and there is a share of it for each party that cannot be dropped from it:

Disavowal here is as dangerous as an improvised accusation in that it neglects the assessment that alone can determine the future horizon and the method of struggle. However, what is more dangerous than that is the petty-bourgeois regimes that were surprised by the defeat, whose impotent program was interrupted before its completion, and who were completely naked in front of our masses, found that they could use their hand for the armed resistance

movement as a “fig leaf,” at least, in an unexpected type of self-defense: We have mentioned that the presence of reactionary Arab regimes playing the role of direct agents of imperialism was one of the reasons that prevented the practical downfall of the defeated nationalist-petty-bourgeois regimes, as they remained able, amidst that loss, to represent something that attracted the spontaneous loyalty of the masses, and this led to their rush to seize more of that loyalty by racing to support guerrilla work.

This competition, which was driven primarily by tactical incentives, took on the character of noisy and exaggerated noise, and the lack of the Palestinian resistance in the presence of a strong vanguard and widespread party led to its inability to use the loose atmosphere that surrounded it, and this resulted in a major defect in the picture: on the one hand, the Palestinian resistance is rushing in an atmosphere in which the objective conditions of the revolution have not yet matured at the level of its slogans, and therefore the tools of this revolution are not available at the level of the tasks it confronts. On the other hand, it is surrounded by a broad and loose framework of mass loyalty that it stands unable to mobilize and organize. There is no doubt that the inability and shortcomings of the national Arab parties, and the earthquake that struck them in June (they were already exhausted by the burdens of the military regimes, reactionary regimes, and police regimes, in addition to their own illnesses), have added to the confusion of the picture in the Palestinian and Arab arena alike. However, all of this did not prevent the first revolutionary impulse from occurring, which mobilized the frameworks of the limited resistance movement at that time and proceeded courageously to the battlefield. This impulse was able to work magic on the Arab masses everywhere, but such miracles of the magic remain dependent on the revolution’s ability to organize its effect and mobilize it according to a conscious revolutionary strategy.

This first revolutionary impulse reached its climax in the Battle of Karamah in March 1968, a battle that gave a wonderful example of the ability of a small force not armed with modern weapons to confront a large force and injure its fighters, which inflamed the Arab and Palestinian masses to the greatest extent. However, this battle also led to results on the other side, the enemy side: on the one hand, it alerted Israel to the ferocity of this phenomenon, which it

underestimated at the beginning, and on the other hand, it alerted Arab countries - at various levels - to the danger posed by such a rising power, if it was able to proceed to its extent. One of the results of this was that Israel developed a political and military strategy in confronting the Palestinian armed struggle, and the Arab countries - each according to its needs - developed plans to guarantee their own "borders of security." As for Israel, the architects of its strategy decided to "coexist" with the resistance, by gradually pushing it towards the east, so that it would be concentrated on the eastern bank of the Jordan River, and by working, sometimes with brutality and sometimes with bribery, to "neutralize" the West Bank to the greatest extent possible - so that it essentially constitutes, even if it constitutes a small theater of operations, a human barrier between the Israeli forces on the West Bank of the river clashing with the resistance, and the geographical body susceptible to shock, where the densest Israeli population concentration is, in occupied Palestine. Israel was relatively successful in this (except for its blatant failure in Gaza) and was not only helped in this by a military and security apparatus, a modern and technologically superior population center, and a war society trained for this, but it was also helped at the same level by the almost complete absence of mobilized, organized, educated, and trained, national, and progressive activity in the West Bank throughout the years preceding the occupation in 1967.

Months after the Battle of Karamah, the media related to guerrilla work had reached an extent that the media of the South Vietnamese Liberation Front had not yet reached, and this led to a widening of the gap between the tasks that this media assigned the nascent resistance movement to accomplish and the real capacity, governed by the objective conditions and the revolutionary tool and its maturity, for this movement. Last winter, the Israelis accomplished militarily what they had begun months after the Battle of Karamah. They installed a complex barrier on the West Bank of the river in an attempt to use the proceeds of all technological colonial expertise to prevent the movement of guerrilla groups to the West Bank of the river. Thus, in comparison with the level reached by the first revolutionary impulse that rose to its peak in the wake of the Battle of Karamah, the guerrilla work, relatively speaking, is now going through a stage of stagnation. This stagnation is not due only to military reasons and circumstances, but is primarily due to the fact that the Palestinian

and Arab media, insofar as they wanted, if they did well to mobilize the Arab masses, numbed them again, and in doing so, at various levels, took the wrong path that the regimes were taking. Before June, this path led to considering public enthusiasm from the positions of spectators as an alternative to fighting by them, with them, in front of them, and among them. It requires doubling the effort in mobilizing, educating and organizing them.

Periods of stagnation, which come in the wake of the first revolutionary impulse exhausting itself, are a natural phenomenon witnessed by most revolutions in the world, and in essence they do not constitute a dangerous sign. However, it is undoubtedly a period in which the revolution faces a large part of the factors that determine its entire fate, and that depends on the method that should be followed in confronting this phenomenon:

- Do we face such a period by ignoring it?
- Or do we choose a media outlet for it?
- Or do you see us examining the contract without amending the strategy and tactics of its activity?

What ends this stage, and places the resistance at the beginning of the second impulse, which moves it from one stage to another? On its surface, this stage appears to be primarily military, but its causes and effects are undoubtedly political, and that is precisely, on a practical and realistic level, the point at which the military issue appears, isolated from political thought, just a dot floating in the air and the unknown. Here, exactly, the revolutionary theory says its word, and here exactly it seems completely correct to say that the revolutionary theory is not a sectarian closed on itself, but rather a guide for action that is interpreted, so that it becomes able to change.

Periods of stagnation in revolutions usually witness - as historical revolutionary experiences tell us - an unusual growth of strange phenomena. This is because continuing to ignore this state of stagnation naturally and necessarily leads to the emergence of “explanations, causes and phenomena” if they insist on ignoring the real causes and exits - intentionally or negligently - these

phenomena, explanations and causes will inevitably be partial and to a large extent satisfactory. This period of stagnation is a period of the growth of subjectivity at the expense of objectivity, the emergence of manifestations of small partial problems, the exchange of accusations, the occurrence of divisions, the dominance of theories, verbal theories and bidding, side conflicts, the change of leadership figures, and the like. There is no doubt that the continuation of these phenomena for a long period will exhaust the revolution and divide it, or will open a wide door to the lurking enemy, who realizes this practically and in practice, to attempt a final liquidation, which they will try to carry out against the revolution. The way out is undoubtedly to move forward, and there is a necessary process of correction, which is a process that must be practiced on an equal footing and in a dialectical manner, at the political and organizational level and at the level of political and military practices, simultaneously, its achievements must be exchanged in any way one of these three levels, and reflecting themselves in the organic interrelationship between these three issues.

We say: moving forward, in the sense of a true awareness of that close relationship between the national struggle and the class struggle, the dialectical relationship that means the escalation of one side of this one struggle is an escalation of the other, which at the same time means that surrender to one is surrender to the other. This constitutes a strategic necessity that must build a framework that accommodates sufficient flexibility in tactics. The phrase *national struggle* does not mean here the necessity of waging the immediate battle for Arab unity, just as the phrase *class struggle* here does not necessarily mean waging immediate and bloody fighting against the exploiting classes. Rather, these two phrases undoubtedly mean adapting the Palestinian liberation process along the lines of its destiny, fate, and necessities.

We say moving forward: in the sense of a true awareness of the dimensions of the current confrontation, confronting the dense enemy camp mobilized by the armed Palestinian resistance, backed by technological superiority, the capabilities of imperialism, and the complicity of reactionism, in contrast to the millions of Arab masses and paralyzed Arab capabilities, standing in wait. We say moving forward: in the sense of a true awareness of the stage that the

Palestinian resistance is passing through, the stage of diligent work to create a revolutionary climate and the growth of the objective conditions that provide the tools of the revolution capable of achieving such dangerous tasks, quantitatively and qualitatively, replacing loose propaganda media with revolutionary education and national awareness, replacing narrow sectarianism with revolutionary organization, and replacing traditional and semi-traditional military practices with organized, armed, and fighting masses.

The way out of the current impasse can only be achieved through an objective assessment of the character of the stage that the resistance is experiencing in this period, and this assessment is an extremely important issue from a strategic and tactical standpoint, as without it, the resistance will not be able to achieve the ability, to the utmost extent, to understand the dilemma, interpret it and then change it. Without it, the resistance will not be able to use the tasks and methods of a particular stage in this very stage instead of borrowing the tasks, methods and tactics of an advanced stage and employing them in a previous stage.

We have heard, for example, many conversations at the beginning of this year from officials in one of the resistance organizations about the beginning phase of cleansing and liberating the occupied territories, which was destined to go a long way in a short period, and before that, similar talk had spread about a “large operations phase.” In fact, relatively small organizations, from a military standpoint, went so far as to issue war reports about major battles in which more than four hundred fighters were thrown over a distance of tens of kilometers. All of this, and other similar examples, lead us to ask a question about defining the character of the stage that the resistance movement is now passing through, the program it is about to implement in this period, and in the next foreseeable period.

The objective evidence, and the totality of the subjective and non-subjective conditions surrounding the resistance movement now, indicate that this stage is in reality nothing but the stage of further maturing the conditions for the revolution and mobilizing the revolutionary tool capable of waging guerrilla war,

and any burning of this fundamental stage will undoubtedly be reflected in and undermine the coming stages.

This definition is important because it is required to reflect itself immediately on a number of political, organizational, and military issues: It is not reasonable for the current stage to essentially be a stage of preparation, then political practices are emotional and rhetorical, or for military practices to be governed by the principle of tactical wastefulness that the laws of guerrilla war assume. It is not possible to adopt it except at an advanced stage, it is not reasonable for this stage to be a preparation stage, and for the organizational issue in the resistance to not be the primary issue. It is not reasonable for this stage to be a stage of preparation and not to be the stage of determining the political strategic framework. It is an issue of the status and importance of revolting or not revolting, victorious or not victorious. All of these political, organizational, and military issues cannot be resolved except with a revolutionary theory, with evidence of revolutionary action. It is customary to say that the specificity of the Palestinian cause makes it too broad to be contained within the framework of a revolutionary theory. Rather, the truth is exactly the opposite: because of this very specificity, the need for a revolutionary theory is intensified, and because of the complexities of the Palestinian cause, the need for a guide for revolutionary action becomes more urgent than anything else. Because of the specificity of the Palestinian cause, in that one side of it is housing settler-colonialism and the other side is housing a people uprooted from their land, the nationalist dimension of the battle becomes a pivotal issue. Because of the specificity of the Palestinian cause, as one of its parties is an imperialist arm, its other side is a people suffering under the restrictions of exploitative regimes linked, to one degree or another, to the wheel of imperialism, the class dimension in the battle also becomes a pivotal issue. Because of the specificity of the Palestinian cause in that its party is a vanguard of the rich, technologically advanced, exploited world, and its other side, on the Arab side, is shackled by the chains of backwardness, the people's liberation war in the battle becomes a pivotal issue as well. Because of the specificity of the Palestinian cause in that one of its parties is a racist, fascist entity supported by imperialist forces that take the feudal, tribal, reactionary, and puppet regimes in the Arab World as mediators in the ongoing process of plundering the Arab

Revolution and the Arab working classes, the issue of struggle against these regimes becomes a Palestinian front as well, in an indirect way. All of these strategic issues cannot remain suspended in the air while the battle rages on. What is the battle if not all of this together? What is liberation if it is not based on a strategic vision that takes all of this into account?

It is precisely here that the revolutionary theory says its word. All the characteristics and phenomena of this specificity in the Palestinian cause, and the complexities emanating from it, require confronting it scientifically by finding a response at the level of its ramifications, and this can only happen by linking the totality of these phenomena and characteristics, for that particularity, with a single revolutionary logic, with a comprehensive vision, and with a scientific explanation, so that change becomes possible and at the level of that explanation.

2 - The Organizational Dilemma

Organization in revolutionary work is not a technical process of arrangement, but rather a reflection of the doctrinal position, and if it continues to make its way without guidance from the doctrinal position, it will end in a conspiratorial theory, not a revolutionary theory. At best, it will end in a sectarian theory. Organization is the means of theory to implementation, and it is the boat or bridge that Mao Zedong spoke about, and one or another of which is indispensable for crossing from the bank of decision to the bank of practice. When political thought says that the battle is the battle of the masses, it is illogical for the organization - after that - to be non-mass. When political thought acknowledges that the battle is the battle of the poor, exploited classes, it is illogical for the organization to then escape from the fabric of the bourgeoisie or submit to the leadership of this bourgeoisie. When political thought acknowledges that the relationship between thought and action is a dialectical relationship, that there is no abstract thought that is not practiced and experience does not return to it with enrichment and then returns to it with evidence, then it is illogical that the organization does not then place the issue of democracy at the core of its structure. When political thought sees that the stage of battle and its tension call for making quick and visible decisions, it is illogical - after that - that this organization is not reflected in the adoption of the principle of central democracy, and when revolutionary theory acknowledges that knowledge and practice are two sides of a dialectical movement that does not stop, and that they exchange its gains continuously. And since this movement requires continuing to make additions, corrections, and amendments, the organization cannot - after that - fail to adopt the principle of criticism and self-criticism as one of the foundations of its relations. When the revolutionary theory acknowledges that class support is the reserve for national support, and that national support is the provision of the condition that imposes class support, then the organization cannot - after that - fail to place its labor and agricultural extensions in the first place of its activity and continue with these extensions at the level of the nation. When revolutionary theory, by virtue of being primarily a guide to action, is able to capture the

nature of the stage and the period that the struggle effort passes through, then this capture should reflect itself immediately on the nature of the organization, on the priorities of its tasks, and on its method of work at that stage.

It is possible to go on enumerating the aspects of this dialectical relationship between theory and its organizational implications, forevermore, but what concerns us primarily here is specifically tracking this issue in the field of the Palestinian resistance movement, in its current stage: The revolutionary organization, as a vanguard faction in order for it to be able to play its role effectively, it is necessarily required to succeed in preventing the plagues of the reality that it seeks to change from being transmitted to it through the movement of individuals who originally come from that reality and are necessarily burdened with its habits, character, and mentality. In the underdeveloped world, this issue takes on a more serious aspect than anywhere else, and it constitutes one of the first active tasks of revolutionary organization.

The culture of a society is, as is known, the culture of the ruling class, while customs and traditions are a more established and rooted heritage, its dominance is more profound, and therefore uprooting the rotten part of it is a more difficult task. However, if all of this is ignored, it can cause necrosis in the revolutionary organization if it is not treated consciously from the beginning, and it can eventually succeed in transferring the ills of backward society to the organization itself, so that the organization fails, not only in presenting a living and miniature model of the future struggle to which it dedicates itself, but also in achieving its basic tasks, since - at that time - personal relationships replace objective relationships, subjective vision replaces scientific vision, sectarian, family or tribal clashes replace comradely interactions, sanctity of personality replaces collective leadership, and loose chaos replaces central democracy, superiority over the masses is the place of interaction with them, stubborn opposition is the place of criticism and self-criticism, and individualism and temperament are the in place of discipline. A backward society is capable of transmitting its plagues to any revolutionary organization, if this organization cannot be armed with a universal theory controlling the organizational issue, and without that, this organization loses its ability to represent a vanguard faction that confronts tasks of struggle that have a historical role. Indeed, it

loses its basic meaning as a mass organization that moves among the masses like a fish moves in water, exchanges understanding and friendliness with these masses, knows their problems, knows scientific methods for solving them, and teaches it without stopping learning from it. How can these complex problems be solved?

When we say that Palestinian organizations at the heart of armed resistance have become, a few years after their establishment, bureaucratic bureaucracy, this statement does not mean at the direct level only their organizational problems, but it also means that they lack, in the first place, a revolutionary theory without which the organizational issue cannot be solved. Despite this, among other things, it led to clear and directly apparent organizational results that appear to be the problems in themselves. There is no doubt that these problems are minimal in the context of the practices themselves, provided that these practices are able to do their job in amending and correcting the theoretical vision, here specifically the indispensable importance of organizational work is highlighted. Perhaps it is not an exaggeration to say that one of the most important reasons which led to the opening of this vast gap between the programs of many Arab parties and their applications, before or after they came to power, or even in the field of struggle outside power, is due to the failure of those parties to solve the organizational dilemma. A danger of this kind must not be underestimated in its importance for the Palestinian armed resistance now, not only because of the extreme sensitivity of this stage, which is the stage of working to mature the conditions for the revolution, but also because of the ongoing combat practices undertaken by the Palestinian organizations, on the continuation and escalation of which a large part depends on the possibility of implementing its editorial programmes. Because of these combat practices in particular, a first organizational dilemma emerges, which must occupy priority of attention among resistance circles. This dilemma boils down to the necessity of avoiding falling into “fetishism” or “idolism” in building an organization, because this organization is now required in particular to be armed with an organizational vitality that is corresponding with the dangers and expectations surrounding it. We can easily notice, with regret, that such organizational vitality, and the flexible capabilities that it requires, are to a large extent an issue that is not taken care of as it should be in some resistance

organizations, these movements that act as if they are legitimate movements - in comparison with the regimes surrounding them and the lurking enemy. On a daily basis - on the contrary, these organizations are required to have a level of vitality and flexibility capable of being transferred to different levels of activity, clandestine or not, direct or indirect, visible or hidden, gathered or widespread, these levels constitute necessities from which there is no escape when they should. It can be expected at any moment, not only because of the nature of the political and military activity of resistance organizations, but also because of the Arab and international circumstances surrounding it, which are subject to change at any moment.

[The leadership elements of the resistance - in most organizations - are completely exposed, as are their methods of work, movement, and communications, as well as to a large extent, their formations, centers, and offices. Indeed, some Palestinian resistance organizations may be the only ones of their kind in the world that publicly use their secret names and clandestinely keep the real names of their members. Although the person who bears both names is often known by many people by both his [fake] name and his [real] name at the same time! Under the pretext of propaganda activity, some resistance organizations opened their doors wide to journalists or the curious, recording millions of precious meters now distributed everywhere about training methods, the size of patrols, the distribution of raiders in the raiding group, the types of weapons used, the methods used to plant mines, and the physical competencies of the fighters.] It is truly short-sighted to believe that the enemy needs more than that to know the nature of the competencies and methods of the elements that his patrols will face. Under the pretext of international struggle, which some resistance factions have clung to by the tail, the so-called “internationalists” have been able to spend months in the fighters’ camps, examine with sufficient and calm opportunity the methods of thinking and planning, and discover with the utmost freedom the problems and weaknesses in the persons of the leaders and the military, in their methods of work, their planning capabilities, and their organizational or personal ambitions.

This, no matter how small the chances of it leaking into the hands of the enemy, greatly weakens the flexibility of a resistance organization to move to a

different organizational form that may be imposed by developments in the battle at any moment. If we add to that, the resistance organizations are in the first place - for the most part - not preparing their structures. Organizational structures are unable to carry out such a necessary transformation at any moment, and they often move towards a rocky or idolatrous organizational structure that is not qualified for such a transformation. We immediately realized the seriousness of this dilemma. However, there is another dilemma that may be of equal importance, which is the effect of emotionalism on the organization. This effect often leads to dangerous results, because it governs an organization with a reaction complex, so the activity of the leadership elements of that organization, and then the non-leadership elements, deviates towards a direction that gradually strays from the core revolutionary missions that the said organization assigned itself to carry out in the first place.

Such a danger is, of course, more likely in organizations that emerge from a party split, as the first motive for the dissident party - (who usually knows more about the thing it does not want than about the thing he does want) - is to prove the justification for its split and thus its existence of daily proof. If the objective facts in this field fail it, it begins, without realizing it, to contrive them: it gradually loses the global vision for the stage, resorts to theoretical and media outreach, and then - in the course of asserting its justifications - it works, consciously or unconsciously, to focus on attempts to destroy the organization that it had split from. On its part, and in many cases this phenomenon not only takes on the nature of a daily, most important and urgent concern, but it also forces it - gradually - to fabricate an artificial campaign of lies, rumors, and accusations to help it continue with that mission. The original party that was the site of the dissent is exposed to a similar danger, as this campaign naturally leads to a convulsive reaction, the elimination of whose effects depend to a large extent on the integrity of the organizational structure, which is usually better able, by virtue of its conviction of its solidity and time-rootedness, to overcome the effects of that emotional charge. There is no doubt that such an emotional phenomenon, if left to its full extent, leads to dangerous organizational repercussions, as it destroys the scale of struggle priorities, and leads to directing the entire organization towards a partial battle that is contrived at its foundation, at the expense of the point of gravity in the battle.

It goes without saying that such a thing - if it happened in the left camp - leads to opening the door wide, not only to the exhaustion of the revolutionary forces that nominate themselves to lead the process of change, but inevitably to the entry of the right and the center.

However, this emotional phenomenon, at the organizational level, is not limited in its origins to organizations that were parties to a party split - (which the resistance movement witnessed last year and is still witnessing its repercussions) - but it also constitutes a possibility for other organizations that were not parties that had yet split, to then raise them. In particular, the phenomena of multiplicity in organizations, and the incentives of monopolies and guardianship, are kindled by inciting forces from outside the revolution. All of this reflects itself organizationally, not only on the political and combat competencies of the resistance movement, and on the size of the mass rally around it, but also on the way and method of dealing with extremely important strategic issues, such as the issue of the National Liberation Front, the unity of the armed struggle, and confronting a current enemy, a potential enemy, etc.

This is an aspect of the importance and centrality of the organizational issue and its repercussions on the course of the revolution.

However, in the stage of initiating the armed struggle, aspects emerge that are almost more important at the level of practices and their relations with the organization, because in a case of this type, organizational errors are not merely a violation of the rules, but are practically of the same nature of immediate results related to the fate of the revolution as a whole, and the blood of its elements. We will take one example of this, which can summarize the issue we are dealing with on a practical level, which is the issue of military bases, which constitute here, and precisely that extremely important point in which it crystallizes on a material level, the center of that meeting between the theoretical issue, the organizational issue, and the military issue.

What is the military base in the Palestinian struggle now? What is its role, besides being a combat leaping point? It is, of course, an organizational form charged with playing its role, in practice, to put theory into practice. Is it then a military barracks where the group includes conventional, semi-conventional, or

unconventional fighters? The main axis of this mighty, complex shield, which we call for short “the struggle for the liberation of Palestine,” finds in this issue the basic hinge in the whole matter. The military base gathered by the guerrillas, at this stage in which scientific theory - as a guide for action - determines its nature and dialectical arrangement in the entire battle, can only be a revolutionary hotspot, charged with playing its combat and political role, through the main task of the Palestinian revolution now, which is the task of combat and political work to mature the objective conditions that lead towards the people’s liberation war. This means, by revolutionary necessity, that the base should not be a Palestinian translation of the barracks, but it must be a revolutionary cell, military and political at the same time, volunteering its political and military work to build a more comprehensive and expansive revolutionary climate.

Its military work is dialectically linked to its organizational role as a revolutionary force that undertakes a persistent process of transferring the combat ideal it presents to the masses, to establish a dialogue between its activity and the masses, to “infect” - so to speak - the static reality surrounding it, and to attract it to the battle. How can you play this role? How can it - in practice - generalize the theoretical and organizational position that calls on every fighter to be a politician and every politician to be a fighter? This question brings us back to the pivotal point in all of this that we have said, which is the one that emphasizes to the end the ongoing dialectical relationship between the theoretical issue and its necessity, the organizational issue and its importance, and the practice issue and its strategy.

3 - The Military Dilemma

Perhaps these last passages have practically led us to talk about the military dilemma in reality of the armed Palestinian resistance, before we reach its place in the “impossible classification.” That example that we deliberately chose, of the issue of the military base in guerrilla work, constitutes an aspect of this dilemma, as its solution is a fundamental issue, because it resolves the issue of whether the resistance will reach, or not reach, the stage of implementing the slogan common to all its organizations, a slogan of a People’s Liberation War. War as Mao Zedong defines it, “is bloody politics.”⁹ Therefore, neglecting political mobilization for those who want victory makes it equivalent to “someone who goes to the South while driving his cart to the North.”¹⁰ Hence, Ho Chi Minh believes that “the military rather than the political is a tree without roots, which is not only sterile but also harmful.” The goal of a just war is to achieve peace, and this happens by annihilating the enemy and preserving oneself at the same time. These are two contradictory issues in their essence, and here in particular, strategy and tactics intervene to tip the balance in favor of one of them. As long as the goal of war is such, it is natural that its ferocity will intensify the more ferocious and powerful force obstructing true peace. This phenomenon is particularly evident in the stages of stagnation, which we have talked about previously, as these stages become longer or shorter according to the importance and entrenchment of the goals that this or that party is struggling for. This issue gives increasing importance to the political aspect and political mobilization in the war.

But before proceeding with the details, it is necessary to have a general and brief acquaintance with the objective characteristics, because without specifying these characteristics, any progress in analysis will remain (like a blind confrontation) tantamount to a method of confronting divination with the unknown.

⁹ Mao Zedong - Selected Works (Beijing), Vol. 2, p. 215.

¹⁰ Same source, p. 216.

First: The main arena of confrontation, if we look at it as an Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is characterized by the small geographical area under dispute, and this peculiarity results in extremely important military repercussions. The small area provides the oppressive Israeli military force with the ability to quickly move, maneuver, cover, and deprives the armed Palestinian resistance of flexibility and the broad lines over which guerrilla warfare requires the necessity of large maneuvers and free movements.

Mao Zedong considered the expansion of China's territory a tremendous advantage for its revolutionary military capabilities in the protracted war of liberation that it waged against the Japanese occupation. There is also no doubt that this peculiarity is reflected in another and somewhat similar way in Vietnam, where the land is covered by natural phenomena that give the revolution weight to its advantage.

Second: The arena of confrontation - if we consider it Israeli-Palestinian - is characterized by the presence of Zionist housing colonization, which replaced a large part of a people who were expelled from their land and turned into a people of refugees in an area located outside their original land. In this case, the Palestinian revolutionary fighter loses the advantage of being a fish swimming in the sea of the masses. With the exception of the territories occupied after 1967, the Palestinian resistance is in fact facing a hostile public, each of whose elements is at least a "warning instrument." Theories of people's liberation wars have always relied on the numerical superiority of the oppressed people, whose mobilization leads to the disruption of the enemy's military and technical superiority, and the transformation of this quantitative superiority of the masses into a qualitative superiority. However, in the arena of the Palestinian-Israeli confrontation, the quantitative reality on both sides is almost equal. This reality - in this way - deprives the Palestinian resistance of an essential element of victory in the people's liberation wars.

Third: In addition to that, there is an important peculiarity on both sides of the confrontation now. While the Israeli side is distinguished - until now - by strongly adhering to the Herzlian theory that defines the nation as "a group of people united by the presence of a common danger against it," it has faced, on the

Palestinian side, dispersion and fragmentation in the national factions, in addition to geographical dispersion and fragmentation in a large section of the Palestinian people.

Fourth: The Israeli side is concerned with technological superiority supported by the support and contribution of the entire imperialist camp and the efforts of the global Zionist establishment, while the masses of the Palestinian people belong to the developing Third World, with all the meanings of this word being backwardness, but it is backwardness that adds to itself a parasitic phenomena, in many cases. It expresses itself in many elements climbing over the crust of relative economic and technical progress copied by the Arab bourgeoisie linked to the interests of imperial companies and institutions.

These current main characteristics, in their apparent negative form, are the same ones that impose indispensable strategic principles within which the Palestinian resistance movement must be placed.

It is necessary and scientific to summarize the two titles of this new strategy with two basic slogans that turn the balance of power in favor of the resistance:

- The national character of the Palestinian resistance, in its vanguard class content.
- The slogan of the National Front, Palestinian and Arab.

The negative results that we obtained from reviewing the four characteristics of the confrontation field were due to the monitoring point that we hypothetically chose, which considered the battle to be a purely Palestinian-Israeli battle. In fact, there is no escape from arriving at these negative results if the basic hypothesis is a wrong hypothesis. However, these negative characteristics return and are transformed in their entirety into positive characteristics in the interest of the revolution and in the interest of its victory, if the issue is stopped on its head instead of its feet, and is considered essentially - the issue of the Arab masses, confronting imperialism, Zionism and its tools, as well as its direct or indirect allies.

There is no non-Arab way out, provided that the current historical confrontation is given its class dimension. At that time, the picture changes and the forces capable of destroying it and surpassing it rise up in the face of the enormous enemy camp: then the geographical characteristics of the Arab continent as a whole become characteristics of the revolutionary interest, and then Arab superiority becomes quantitatively capable of leaping towards a qualitative quality, capable of overcoming the power enjoyed by the small opponent due to its current technical superiority. Then the toiling Arab millions, who have the most urgent interest in undermining the occupation, defeating imperialism, and cutting off its arms extending outside the occupied territory, will mobilize:

- The enemy's military strength, which it derives from the small area on whose lines it maneuvers, turns into weakness, as its total presence turns into an oppressive camp, or merely a barracks surrounded on all sides and attacked from every side.
- Its superior ability to mobilize its own forces and attract imperial support and backing for them turns into a suicidal operation in the face of a more massive mobilization of millions of Arabs.
- Its ability to resolve battles with its conventional striking arms turns into a fatal contradiction in the face of the protracted people's war, which deepens its path with every military strike it carries out.

If we look at the Palestinian resistance, in its current state, through this strategic horizon, it does not become - as some might imagine - less important. Rather, on the contrary and in complete contrast to that, it becomes doubly important and of historical urgency in the race for a revolution that must be a sign of the greatness of peoples in their arduous struggle.

The Palestinian resistance, which was qualified by the circumstances and pioneering Palestinian initiatives for such a historic mission, is called upon, through this strategic horizon more than anything else, to ignite the great revolution.

Without such a strategic horizon, on the basis of which any tactical action must adjust its direction, the Palestinian resistance is then likely to remain in a stage of stagnation. There is no doubt that the prolongation of a phase of this type will lead to a decline in the interest of the resistance, and the support of the Arab national and progressive forces for the Arab resistance will gradually turn into being considered a “fig leaf” that covers part of the nakedness of these forces in front of our masses without committing them to practical, revolutionary practices at the level of the resistance programme.

Just as the Arab regimes made the Palestinian resistance a “fig leaf” that covered up the nakedness that befell it in the June defeat, the Arab parties, factions, and national formations are likely to follow the same path if the armed resistance does not open a door for them to actually join their relentless rising movement and their strategy that sets the horizon for the Palestinian cause. The Arab mass struggle, even if it did not push it - by providing an example, through controversy, and through a program - to play its historical role.

Hence, the Palestinian resistance movement is required to prevent it from being used by Arab regimes or by Arab factions and parties (as a fig leaf) that absolves those regimes of their defeat.

These parties absolve themselves of their future responsibilities before their masses, and this alone is the value of the daily example provided by the resistance movement, as through that example it presents a binding level of struggle, an analogy for the programs of the national and progressive Arab parties and forces, and calls on them to bear arms within that strategic horizon that overlooks a major Arab revolution. The Palestinian battle then becomes organically linked to the principle of building Hanoi or Arab Hanoi, and these two issues become intertwined in a way that is difficult to separate.

This dialectical process must be pushed to its climax with armed struggle, and we must work with all strength to tip the current balance of power in favor of the national and progressive Arab and Palestinian forces. We must acknowledge from the beginning that all of this becomes impossible, and a kind of illusion if it does not start from the belief that the battle is a protracted war, led by the vanguard mass forces, at the level of the entire Arab World.

It does not seem that there is a circumstance that necessitates initiating the implementation of this programme more than the current circumstance. It does not seem that there is a more qualified tool to initiate this shift than the armed Palestinian resistance movement. It does not seem that there is a clearer and more effective guide to action than Marxism-Leninism, creatively combined with the militant heritage of Arab nationalism.

The confrontation in its current context is nothing more than a “state of stability” on those hundred miles in the Jordan Valley (if we exclude the great value of the violent resistance raging in the Gaza Strip) - it is also the case that we did not consider it to be a capsule of a mine of enormous power and effectiveness planted in the heart of this vast Arab continent, and if we did not use this capsule to detonate that mine.

How can all of this be achieved in light of the current military situation of the resistance? Rather - before that - what is the real military situation of the resistance now in comparison to its tasks and slogans?

Militarily, the armed resistance, like all people’s liberation wars, aims to create a set of fatal contradictions in the enemy camp:

To force them to gather to strike us, so that we disperse and strike them everywhere, or that they disperse to strike us everywhere, so that the strike gathers in their weakest link. To force them to advance in order to retreat. If we exhaust them, we strike them. If they retreat, we bite their rear lines. If they stop, we besiege them, and if they besiege us, we disappear. To deny them the maximum amount of help they can get, and to widen the gap of their contradictions with the masses of the lands they occupy, then their losses and the climate of anxiety and exhaustion in which they live lead to the widening and intensification of the contradiction within their own society. In response to this disintegration of their strength and energies, the resistance mobilizes its own strength and energies by consolidating its relations at all levels with its masses, and all of this upsets the balance of power, and turns the few into many, weakness into strength, and strategic defense into strategic attack.

As for the Palestinian resistance now, it has not yet reached the point of provoking the necessary amount of these contradictions among the enemy's ranks. It is true that it forced them to some extent to disperse, but at the same time they still maintain a gathered fierce force capable of carrying out major operations if necessary.¹¹

The reality of the resistance, as a young armed movement, and through an objective assessment of the difficult circumstances in which it grew, which had deprived it of any opportunity to organize and mobilize before the defeat of June 1967, now suffers from fundamental weaknesses, which can be summarized - in general terms - as follows:

- Fixed military bases are a phenomenon that is almost common among some factions of the resistance movement. Staying stationary does not only provide the enemy with an easy target, but also provides them with important information about the training and arming of individuals, their combat competencies, and their methods of activity. There is no doubt that guerrilla work sites must be mobile and flexible, not only for protection reasons, but also for the ability to accomplish their missions as a cell with a role mobilizational, organizational, and educational in its surroundings.
- Israel aims to put the resistance in a corner and make it lose the initiative that characterizes the armed work of the gangs. This is precisely what puts the resistance now in a defensive position, but it is a situation that has not been able to reach the principle of strategic defense, which is characterized - in wars of liberation - by mobile warfare supported by the gangs and partially complemented by positional warfare.¹²

If this stage is usually characterized by massive losses inflicted on the gangs, it is also characterized, in contrast, by the necessity of building the National Front and using the situation to the maximum extent in political mobilization.

¹¹ These excerpts are based on an interview conducted by Al-Hadaf with a military official in the Popular Front about the military situation of the resistance at this stage.

¹² Mar, op. cit. p. 191.

By analogy, the first task at this stage - for the resistance - is to adopt mobile warfare in a more decisive manner, and to build a broad national front.

- The scientific and training level within the resistance is in a less capable state with rapid development than it should be. It is now absolutely necessary to leave the mechanical and traditional programmes of the military training process, and advance them towards producing new leadership and field competencies to create fighters capable of initiative and increased capabilities to confront a rapidly moving and developing enemy.

This is reflected, for example, in the slowness of the armed resistance movement in responding to the enemy's tactics, compared to the resounding speed in changing its methods, tactics, and traps.

This type of dialectic in connection with the enemy must be turned upside down. Losing the enemy's initiative and transferring it to the resistance, meaning the resistance's speed in changing its tactics, traps, and methods as soon as the enemy discovers them, and always putting it in a position of delayed reaction for a flexible, constantly evolving work.

"News and World Report" magazine (3/6/1967) says: "American officers admit that the danger of Vietnamese traps cannot be avoided, and an American officer declared that in every operation carried out by its forces it discovers new traps invented by the men of the Vietnamese National Liberation Movement, and it says it hardly tells its soldiers about a new trap before they fall into a trap even worse than that of Jeddah."

This advantage, which depends primarily on the level of training and initiatives of the resistance movement, is still missing until now, and should be given more attention. In fact, the enemy still to a large extent maintains this type of initiative.

There is another weak point that can be summed up in the direction to which organizational mistakes can lead that are not given the attention they deserve. The first of these is the organizational behavior that can lead to the creation of

a militaristic class in the Palestinian resistance linked to rank and salary, at a time when the resistance most needs to consolidate and deepen their character as revolutionary gang factions. Perhaps this mistake was more prominent in the Palestine Liberation Army, which established a traditional upbringing and still does to a large extent.

The second of these organizational mistakes is the need to control the ownership of the fighter so that it can present itself to the masses as a model for the new humanity it is fighting for.

In addition to that, and even before that, there is a fundamental weakness, which is the dispersion of the resistance factions, the lack of a unified military plan, and the lack of coordination and creative cooperation between them.

Perhaps this particular point is the crux of the entire issue, and the starting point towards finding real solutions to all the problems that, to one degree or another, emanate from it.

The demand of the broad National Front, whose parties are committed to a minimum program and clear revolutionary relations, is a demand that can only be an indispensable basis for any revolutionary action aimed at obtaining real and progressive results. It is certain that without such a united front, the resistance will lose much of its capabilities. At the same time, it will lose much of its ability as the nucleus of a united national front between all the national and progressive factions in the Arab World. This front will inevitably be at the core of the strategic horizon of the Palestinian resistance movement.

Of course, the opportunity has not passed, but awareness of the value of this opportunity is something that must be emphasized and practiced practically. Any serious revolutionary trend cannot help but revolve in a vicious circle if it does not place at the heart of its current slogans the slogan of building, strengthening, and expanding the national front. When we say a national front, we are aiming with this expression at what it actually means, that is, away from spontaneous accumulation.

Quite the contrary - it is committed to the maximum extent to a minimum program that is being consolidated and developed through its practices, experiences, and lessons.

This slogan brings us back, in a dialectical way, to the true meaning of political thought in the resistance movement: its necessity and prospects as a guide for action, and in the same way it brings us back to the true meaning of the organizational issue: its necessity, prospects, and value as an indispensable tool for transferring that programme to the level of application and practice.

The historical value of this triangular key must once again be emphasized, with which alone the door can be opened to the horizons of victory extending to our masses, who deserve that victory to the extent that their vanguard factions are aware of the reality of the battle and its dimensions.

- There must be a broad national front that includes the national Palestinian factions.
- There must be an Arab strategic horizon at the national level.
- There must be a progressive dimension based on class.

All of this cannot be achieved easily, this is certain. Magic wands do not create history. Rather, history is transformed by the masses who understand it and are determined to change it. [The path is difficult and arduous, but it is worth the blood of those who fight valiantly in order to achieve victory, and in order to be loyal to them, those who came before us and were martyred for our sake, we only have to be at the level of the cause for which they gave - without hesitation - their blood, and in order to be loyal to the future that we want for generations. The emerging Arabic language must be up to the tasks required, and we must advance courageously, penetrating the wall, to deserve the flag that the blood of our masses has been drenching for fifty years.]

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The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, through this vision of the current stage and its dilemmas, presents its lines of thought and strategic lines at the political, organizational, and military levels, and through this vision - it presents the broad outlines of a national unity programme between the various factions of the Palestinian resistance in particular, and the Arab resistance in general, to fulfill the obligations of the battle, and its victory.

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